Lauren E. Willis, Juraprofessorin an der Loyola Law School Los Angeles, setzt sich in diesem Aufsatz von 2008 kritisch mit dem Stand der Forschung über finanzielle Bildung und ihre empirisch feststellbaren Wirkungen auseinander.
Willis plädiert für einen politischen Ansatz, der die institutionellen Bedingungen auf den Finanzmärkten so gestaltet, dass die Individuen einfacher und sicherer entscheiden können. Insbesondere schlägt sie vor, ein nationales System unabhängiger Beratung einzurichten, dem die Konsumenten vertrauen können.
Eine normative finanzielle Bildung habe vor allem den Skeptizismus als Grundhaltung gegenüber den Verkäufern von Finanzprodukten zu fördern.

"The demands of society and the marketplace today require more than knowledge of and desire to follow financial norms. Thus, a norms model of financial education would be effective in improving consumer welfare only if concurrent public policies simplified the decisions and actions our society and marketplace require so as to facilitate application of these norms." (Willis 2008, S. 19)

"This raises the possibility that rather than education, a better public policy response to consumer finance problems might be a national system of licensed pro bono financial advisors. Consumers would need sufficient education to select a trustworthy and qualified advisor, but would not need to perform difficult calculations, judge the value of information sources, or perform economic forecasting themselves.

The two proposals dovetail in some respects. FNE [Financial Norms Education] might inculcate a norm of scepticism about claims made by sellers of financial products by explaining financial scams and sellers’ financial incentives to steer consumers to products that generate the most revenue for the seller. Many “consumer rights education” programs include this in their curricula already, as do some debtor education programs. A skepticism norm might be sufficient for simple financial matters, but for complex decisions the skepticism standing alone could lead to consumer fear without a way of distinguishing between scams and good financial products. In turn, skepticism about the market’s offerings could lead consumers to seek out financial advisors for assistance. Provided that these advisors are trustworthy, qualified, and affordable, the best FNE might espouse a norm of relying on these advisors for help.

These policies and others should be tried and tested." (Willis 2008, S. 19)